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What Do Philosophers Disagree about When They Disagree about Toad Representation? 
Comments on Morrison’s Structuralism about Representation 
 
Instead of asking “What is X?” one should focus on the roles one wants X to play and see what 
can play the roles. This leads naturally to a sort of pluralism.   --- David Chalmers 
 
I. Clarifying the Issue: What is John Claiming about Representation in Simpler Systems that Others 
Would Disagree with – for instance Neander (2017) and Shea (2018)?   
 
If apply Chalmers’s (2011) “subscript gambit”, find agreement among parties: all agree different theorists 
“define-up” different naturalistic notions of representation: RepresentationMILLIKAN, RepresentationNEANDER, 
RepresentationMORRISON, etc. We can all agree:  
 
[1] As Millikan understands “representation”, toad representsMILLIKAN nutritious thing.  
[2] Toad representsNEANDER elongated thing.  
[3] Wild toad primarily representsMORRISON same species and secondarily representsMORRISON worm.    
[4] Captive toad primarily representsMORRISON same shape secondarily representsMORRISON elongated thing, etc. 
 
So, what precisely is the locus of disagreement? John’s answer: there’s privileged, pretheoretic notion of 
representation tied to explanation of success (Ramsey-Lewis role?): call it “S-Representation”. And John’s 
unique claim – which other parties will reject – is substantive, informative identity-claim: 
 
Morrison’s Thesis about Toads: S-Representation really is representationMORRISON - not 
representationNEANDER, Etc. Consequently, toads S-Represents John’s favored candidates, not Neander’s, 
not Shea’s, etc.  
 
I still worry debate is unclear. Debates about “representation” can be clear and significant when 
concern a notion (“C-representation”) def. tied to consciousness, belief-desire, etc. But John’s target notion 
of “S-Representation” is totally unmoored from such person-level states. I worry he still hasn’t provided it 
with a clear enough meaning that it might uniquely refer to one of the candidate naturalistic relations over 
the others. So the issue of “S-representation” in toads is indeterminate (Papineau’s view in 1998, p.6) and 
the right attitude is one of “pluralism”. Also: if apply Sider’s (2011, chap. 4) test, issue not-substantive.   
Best Response: the debate should be understood relative explanatory utility in cog. science of 
different naturalistic notions of representation (“conceptual engineering”). Then John’s unique claim – 
locus of disagreement - becomes:  
 
Better Explanation Claim: Explanations of Toad (Bee, etc.) behavioral success in terms of 
representationMORRISON are “better explanations” than explanations in terms of representationNEANDER, or 
representationSHEA, etc.  
 
In Representation in Cognitive Science, Shea seems to understand debate as concerning relative 
explanatory utility. Shea would presumably disagree with Better Explanation: Shea would say that his 
favored naturalistic notion - representationSHEA - provides “better” explanations of behavioral success in 
toads and bees than do other naturalistic notions of representation, including John’s (28-31, 160) 
But doesn’t make much progress in clarifying the debate. Notion of “goodness of explanation” itself 
notoriously murky. If John accepts my suggestion, I invite him to address the question: in precisely what 
ways are explanations of Toad behavioral success in terms of representationMORRISON “better than” 
explanations in terms of representationNEANDER, etc. What’s wrong with explanatory pluralism: all these 
naturalistic notions of representation provide pretty good explanations of behavioral success in toads and 
bees, and it’s not the case that one of them uniquely provides the “best” explanations?1  
                                                     
1 Some might respond: it’s methodologically sensible to start with a first debate about “representation” in simpler creatures like toads and bees, 
and then move on to more complex case of humans. For instance, some (Tye, Dretske, Fodor) make building-block assumption: “conscious 
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2. Second Question: What’s the Argument for John’s Structuralist Theory of S-Representation 
in Simpler Creatures? 
 
We just saw that, on best interpretation, John’s distinctive structuralist theory is equivalent to:  
 
Better Explanation Claim: Explanations of toads’ and bees’ behavioral success in terms of 
representationMORRISON are “better explanations” than explanations in terms of representationNEANDER, etc. 
 
If this interpretation correct, then this is where the debate should focus. Arguments for John’s theory must 
be arguments for the Better Explanation Claim. But in precisely what ways are explanations of Toad 
behavioral success in terms of John’s structuralist notion “better than” explanation in terms of other 
naturalistic notions of representation, e. g. the historical notions of Neander (2017) and Shea (2018).  
Against historical theories, John mentions (i) brain parts are re-purposed and (ii) “advantageous 
mutations” (Pietroski’s Kimus?).  
 
Argument from Cases: In these cases, John’s structuralist notion of representation provides better 
explanations of successful behavior than Shea and Neander’s historical notions. 
 
I invite John to say more. Shea (2018) considers range of case-studies and argues that overall his historical 
notion of representation provides best explanations of successful behavior. Supporting John’s theory = 
showing, to the contrary, that representationMORRISON provides better explanation of successful behavior.  
 
Argument from Color Representation. In a series of papers: color representation = structuralist 
representationMORRISON. If it is right, Toad and Bee representation = structuralist representationMORRISON 
 
 But problems. Imagine Miriam released from black-white room and sees red tomato for first time. 
Given minimal intentionalism, a notion of representation, C-representation, such that Miriam C-
represents yellow. But, because John’s structuralist theory gradualist, it implies: initially Miriam’s color 
experience doesn’t yet representMORRISON anything.2 Therefore, C-representation ≠ representationMORRISON. 
(Given internalism, BIV makes the same argument.) Same argument applies to Miriam’s initial color 
belief about tomato. (In fact, contents of our mature beliefs don’t seem “structural”.)  
(Structuralism also a bit problematic when taken as a theory of S-Representation of color (separable 
from conscious experience), rather than C-representation. If Miriam doesn’t initially representMORRISON 
anything about tomato, representationMORRISON cannot explain her successful behavior.)  
A final point. John - like Shea, Neander - reductive, naturalist theory. Many: we can’t give such a 
theory of anything: Stich 1992 on “grooming behavior”. Why need such a theory of representation? Burge: 
 
I believe that trying to reduce representation to something more “naturalistically acceptable” is probably pointless and 
hopeless (298).  I will proceed on the assumption that notions of perception and representation have a place in scientific 
explanation. They do not need reduction to be scientifically acceptable. They are irreducible notions. Origins. Shea, 175 
 
                                                     
representation” = simple representation + meeting further (access/role) condition. But this doesn’t address my worry. It doesn’t tell me how to 
understand the “first debate”. Also, btw, I think John must reject building-block assumption. For he thinks that BIV duplicate has same conscious 
states as you, and similar beliefs, but BIV doesn’t representMORRISON  anything. If so, he must deny that conscious representation, belief 
representation, etc. = representationMORRISON  + meeting some further condition. Likewise Shea, p. 169,  denies “building block” approach: because 
of Swampman, he says nothing like his historical account of “simple representation” applies to conscious, person-level representation, which he 
says is ahistorical: “my view does not imply that a swamp human would lack contentful conscious states or thoughts . . . fixed ahistorically.” 
2 Here is John on gradualism in his 2018: “Phenomenal characters are like meaningless symbols that become meaningful over time . . . When 
Miriam first perceives an object as [redder] than another, her perceptions won’t match any particular relation, so she won’t perceive 
[represent] any particular relation.” 
